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Economic Notes
by Terry O ’Shaughnessy
On April 1, the Fraser government set up a 
top level committee to review the operations of 
the Trade Practices Act. Within hours it came 
under strong attack from Mr. Mick Young, 
Labor spokesman on industry and commerce.
The committee has been given wide powers 
to investigate and report on all aspects of anti­
trust legislation. It does not include a 
re p re s e n ta tiv e  o f any  c o n s u m e rs ’ 
organisation, or of the trade union movement.
Its members are: Mr. T.B. Swanson 
(chairman), former deputy chairman of 
Imperial Chemical Industries of Australia and 
New Zealand Ltd.; Mr. J.A. Davidson, 
m anaging d ire c to r of C om m onwealth  
Industrial Gases Ltd.; Professor A. Kerr, 
professor of economics at Murdoch University 
and a former chairman of the WA Consumer 
Affairs Council; Mr. H. Schreiber, a Sydney 
solicitor, and Mr. A.G. Hartnell from the 
Department of Business and Consumer 
Affairs.
“The chairman of the committee", Mick 
Young said, "has been associated with a 
company that has been embroiled in several 
investiga tions  by the Trade Practices 
C om m ission invo lv ing  massive price  
d is c r im in a t io n  d e s ig n e d  to  d e s tro y  
competition by selling goods below cost.”
Commonwealth Industrial Gases (CIG) 
currently has three applications for clearance 
and authorisation before the Trade Practices 
C om m ission. One concerns techn ica l 
information sharing arrangements it has with a 
US company; another concerns a similar 
agreement it has with a UK company; and the 
third is about conditions the company 
attaches to the sale of particular containers, 
namely that the gases should not be resold.
CIG also made an application to the 
commission which, if accepted would have 
prevented a new competitor entering the 
industry. The application opposed the 
agreements between BHP and Linde for the 
supply of gases to the new market entrant.
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"Another member of the committee” , Mr. 
Young also charges, "is a partner of the 
Minister’s (Mr. Howard’s) brother in a huge 
Sydney law firm which acts for many business 
organisations who since the inception of the 
Trade Practices Act have been opposed to it.”
The committee has been given 12 weeks to 
report on:
* Whether the Act is "achieving its intended 
purpose of creating a free and fairmarket, 
and whether consumers are benefiting".
* Whether the Act is “causing unintended 
d ifficulties or unnecessary costs to the 
public, including business” .
* W hether “ in the cu rre n t econom ic 
circumstances any part of the Act inhibits 
economic recovery contrary to the 
objectives of the government” . And "how 
the Act can be improved” .
It does not take much reading behind 
p h ra se s  l ik e  “ th e  o b je c t iv e s  o f th e  
government” or "intended difficulties or 
unnecessary costs to .... business” to see the 
approach the governm ent expects the 
committee to take.
Young and the Minister, Howard, also 
clashed on the purposes of the Act. "The 
purpose of trade practices legislation is to give 
effect to the broad economic philosophy and 
objectives of the government” , Mr. Howard 
said in announcing the committee.
“The Minister mis-states the purpose of the 
legislation” , Mick Young replied. “The Trade 
Practices Act was never designed or intended 
‘to give effect to the broad economic 
philosophy and objectives of the government’ 
or any other government.”
"Competition is the main purpose of the Act. 
The Act is designed to strengthen the 
competitiveness of private enterprise for the 
benefit of the public as ultimate consumers.”
While it is clear that the Fraser government is 
trying to draw any teeth the Trade Practices 
Commission has that offend its big business 
b a c k e rs , th is  c o m m itm e n t to  ‘ ‘ fre e  
competition” itself merits criticism.
It is unrealistic, or hypocritical, to extoll the 
merits of “ free competition” in the way that 
both the Liberal and Labor parties do w ithout 
coming to terms with the degree to which the 
A ustra lian  econom y is dom ina ted  by 
monopoly capital, and will remain so despite a 
hundred Trade Practices Commissions.
YOU’D THINK WE HAD A MONOPOLY
Industry in Australia, as in other advanced 
capitalist countries, is dominated by a small 
number of giant firms. In the latest available 
Manufacturing Census conducted by the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics for 1972-73, 
th e re  w e re  3 6 ,4 3 7  m a n u fa c tu r in g  
"establishments" owned by a total of 30,389 
“enterprise groups” .
Two hundred of these "enterprise groups" 
or companies, however, outweigh the other 
30,189. Although they make up only 0.68 per 
cent of the number of “enterprise groups” , 
they control 8 per cent of manufacturing 
"establishments” . These, in turn, account for 
over half - 54 per cent - of total manufacturing 
turnover.
These two hundred enterprise groups 
contributed 51 per cent of value added in 
m anu factu ring  ind us try , a ltho ug h  they 
employed only 44 per cent of workers in 
industry. In other words, value added per 
worker was higher in these big firms than in 
industry as a whole.
These firms also accounted fo r 49 per cent 
of wages and salaries paid, which shows that 
their average wage level was slightly higher 
than in the rest of industry.
We can compare value added with wages 
paid per worker for the largest 12, the largest 
25, the largest 50, the largest 100 and the 
largest 200 enterprise groups. (See Table 1.) In 
the 12 biggest firms, value added per worker 
was $9537, while the average wage was $5230 
(remember this is 1972-73). This gives a ratio 
of value added to wages paid of 182 per cent.
For industry as a whole, value added per 
worker was only $8109 - 15 per cent less, but 
wages were also lower and stood at $4392. In 
fact the ratio of value added to wages paid was 
almost the same and came to 185 per cent.
The m ost d ra m a tic  in d ic a to r  o f 
concentrated economic power is the way 
investment is dominated by the largest firms. 
The twelve b iggest en te rp rise  groups, 
although they made up only 17 per cent of 
turnover, 15 per cent of value added, 12 per 
cent of employment and 14 per cent of wages 
paid, accounted for 25 per cent of all fixed 
capital expenditure.
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TABLE 1
Value added per worker, average wage paid and the 
ratio of value added to wage paia in industry as a whole, 
and in the largest companies.
industry the largest companies
as a whole
largest largest largest largest largest
12 25 50 100 200
Value added
per worker($) 8109 9537 9410 9460 9477 9342
Average wage
paid($) 4392 5230 5141 5031 4968 4915
Ratio of value added
to wage paid (per cent) 185 182 183 188 191 190
The largest 200 firms accounted for 54 per 
cent of manufacturing turnover but they were 
responsible for 61 per cent of investment. In 
other words, these big firms are the ones that 
are accumulating capital and growing most 
rapidly, so their domination of the Australian 
economy must increase, not decrease over 
time.
This trend is shown by changes between 
1968-69 and 1972-73. The 200 biggest firms’ 
share of value added grew from 49 to 51 per 
cent, their share of employment from 42 to 44 
per cent and their share of fixed capital 
expenditure from 57 to 61 per cent.
No legislation, and especially no talk about 
the importance of ‘small business' and ‘free 
competition’ arrested this tendency, and we 
can be sure it is continuing today.
FOREIGN CONTROL
Eighty-seven of the largest 200 enterprise 
groups are foreign controlled. Foreign control 
and industry concentration tend to go 
toge ther. Both ind us try  conce n tra tion  
(measured by the dominance of the largest 20 
enterprise groups) and foreign control in the 
largest 20 enterprise groups were above 60 per 
cent (based on value added) in the following 
industries: tobacco products, basic chemicals, 
petroleum refining, non-ferrous metal basic 
products, and motor vehicles and parts.
T hese  87 fo re ig n -c o n t ro l le d  f irm s  
accounted for 45 per cent of the value added of 
the largest 200 enterprises, and 23 per cent of
the value added fo ra ll manufacturing industry. 
Foreign control in the largest 200 firms was 
mainly from the UK and USA (11 percent and 8 
per cent respectively of total manufacturing 
industry value added).
A dd itio na l in fo rm a tion  on ind us try  
concentration is given in annual surveys 
carried out by the Industries Assistance 
Commission. While these surveys have a 
smaller coverage than those carried out by the 
Bureau of Statistics, they include information 
on capital structure and profitability.
This allows us to investigate the mechanism 
that generates monopoly control of the 
economy and to evaluate strategies - on the 
part of the working class, or non-monopoly 
sections of capital - that seek to check this 
tendency.
Results of the latest survey, carried out for 
the financial year 1973-74 and published in the 
lAC’s 1974-75 Annual Report, show a wide 
range of profit levels. Operating profit as a 
p e rc e n ta g e  o f fu n d s  e m p lo y e d  fo r  
manufacturing industry as a whole was 12.6 
per cent, while it ranged from 3 per cent in the 
‘meat products’ sector, to 31.2 per cent in the 
‘soap and other detergents’ sector. Most 
sectors had an operating profit between 10.5 
and 17.5 per cent.
It is clear that there are many factors that 
determine profitability, and our problem is to 
see if there is a relation between monopoly 
control of a sector of industry and profitability 
in that sector.
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T h e  a n s w e r  a p p e a rs  to  be th a t  
m onopo lisa tion  of a sec to r w ill allow  
exceptional profits, but w ill not ensure them. 
Thus manufacturers of ‘soap and other 
detergents’ obtained high profits in a sector 
where the largest five firms accounted fo r 71 
per cent of sales and the largest ten firms 90 
per cent of sales.
in a similar way, tobacco manufacturers 
obtained a profit of 28.3 per cent, the highest of 
all sectors in the ‘food, beverages and tobacco’ 
group. Five tobacco manufacturers account 
for the whole output of this sector.
However, other highly concentrated sectors 
had below average profit levels, including 
‘glass and glass products’, ‘motor vehicles’, 
'petroleum refining’ and ‘rubber products’. 
Sales of the five largest firms in each of these 
sectors accounted for 93, 84, 80 and 73 per 
cent of the total in each case. Respective profit 
levels, though, were only 7,8, 8.9, 7.0 and 8.5 
per cent.
While we cannot here go into the special 
factors which determine profit levels in all 
sectors, and while comparisons between 
sectors from quite different industry groups 
might have little meaning, a pattern does 
emerge if, for example, we look at one industry 
group. The ‘food, beverages and tobacco' 
group has the largest number of sectors, and if 
we rank them in terms of the percentage of 
total industry sales accounted for by the five 
largest firms we obtain a clear trend. (See 
Table 2.)
VALUE, PRICE AND MONOPOLY PRICE
Above average profits can be made in 
monopolised sectors because of the way 
commodity prices are formed in a capitalist 
economy. The operation of this mechanism 
has implications for the capitalist class as a 
whole, and hence for the capitalist state. It also 
affects the working class, though not in the 
simple way that many ideologists of ‘free 
competition’ and ‘an anti-monopoly alliance’ 
assume.
The value of a commodity is created in the 
labor process and equals the amount of 
socially necessary labor time required to 
produce it. Under conditions of simple 
commodity production and exchange we 
would expect commodities which take a 
similar time to be produced to be exchanged 
for each other.
Under capitalist commodity production, 
however, capitalists purchase both labor 
power and means of production and exchange 
the com m od ities  tha t are produced. 
Commodities embodying identical amounts of 
labor might have required the application of 
vastly different quantities of the means of 
production. A capitalist in a sector of industry 
that requires little constant capital would then 
enjoy greater profits than his rivals if he could 
exchange his commodities at their value.
In fact, this does not happen because 
capitalists, seeking the greatest profit, will 
move out of low profit sectors and crowd into
TABLE 2
Profit in the ‘food, beverages and tobacco’
group, by industry sector.
Sector: Percentage of total Operating p ro fit as a
industry sales of the percentage of funds
largest 5 firms. employed.
Meat products 38 3.0
Beverages and malt 47 13.3
F lour and bread products 52 9.0
Fruit and vegitable products 53 9.4
Food products nec 57 14.4
M ilk products 58 9.8
Confectionary 83 11.4
Margarine, oils and fats nec 86 19.2
Raw and refined sugar 90 20.3
Tobacco products 100 28.3
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glut, and so force prices and profits down until 
a general, roughly uniform rate of profit is 
established.
Meanwhile, the few capitalists who remain in 
the former low profit sector w ill take advantage 
of reduced competition and continuing 
demand for their products to raise their prices 
until they, too, obtain the average rate of profit.
This means commodities from sectors 
which require a smaller than average quantity 
of constant capital w ill in general sell below 
their value, and vice versa.
This mechanism clearly depends, however, 
on the tree flow of capital from  one sector to 
another and consequent price competition 
between capitalists in the same sector. If, 
instead, capitalists in one sector are able to 
agree to raise their prices together, and at the 
same time are able to prevent competitors 
from entering the market, they can continue to 
obtain above average profits.
They can do this by relying on the massive 
amount of capital required to start from 
scratch in some new industry; by pressuring 
suppliers or customers not to do business with 
the newcomer; by using political influence to 
block the newcomer’s plans, and by many 
other means.
Everyone else, of course, then has to pay 
these monopoly prices. While workers can 
struggle to increase their money wages to 
preserve their standard of living by going on 
strike, for instance, capitalists in the non­
monopoly sector are stuck with the situation. 
They have to pay the same wage increases to 
their workers that are won in struggles against 
the more profitable monopolies, who can often 
be persuaded to buy industrial peace. At the 
same time, these capitalists must pay 
increased prices for commodities they buy 
from the monopoly sector.
The result is the formation of two rates of 
profit: above average in the monopoly sector, 
and below average in the non-monopoly 
sector.
While it is clear that capitalists in the non­
monopoly sectors will have a continual bone 
to pick with their more powerful rivals overthis 
differential, it is not obvious how this struggle 
will be resolved. Given the economic and 
political domination of monopoly, we might 
expect the interests of this group never to be 
taken into account.
In fact, the state is forced, acting in the 
interests of the capitalist class as a whole, to 
intervene. The key here lies in the problem of 
accumulation. Where newly accumulated 
capital is invested matters not just to the 
capitalist concerned, but to the capitalist class 
as a whole.
The ca p ita lis t class seeks, th rough  
investments in new, more efficient plant, to 
lower the amount of labor required to produce 
the needs of the working class. It is also 
interested in cheapening the raw materials it 
requires in the same way.
If newly accumulated capital cannot be 
invested according to strictly ‘economic’ 
criteria, this aim is frustrated. Thus, the state 
intervenes to regulate particular monopolies 
and to help plan investment. While ideological 
and political support fo r this policy can be 
enlisted by appeals to the non-monopoly 
sector of the capitalist class, and even to the 
working class, the aim is not to further the 
interests of these groups but those of the 
capitalist class as a whole, in which the 
monopoly sector is dominant.
The existence of two rates of profit involves 
the division of the country’s total surplus 
product amongst the capitalist class; as such it 
does not determine the rate of exploitation 
which depends on the real historic standard of 
living the working class has been able to win 
from capital and on the size of the social 
product.
While monopoly pricing may be part of the 
process that leads to this division of the 
product, it does not determine it. Money 
prices, like money wages, do not matter in the 
end, and while the monopolies can sometimes 
decide their pricing policy (and even this 
within limits) they cannot decide the outcome 
of the subsequent struggle with the working 
class and with other sections of capital.
Thus a ‘free competition’ or ‘anti-monopoly’ 
strategy for the working class contains serious 
weaknesses. Firstly, it tends to overestimate 
the autonomy of monopoly pricing. Secondly, 
it misunderstands the role the state plays, and 
can play, in regulating monopolies. Thirdly, it 
ignores the identity of interest between the 
monopoly and non-monopoly sectors of 
capital in increasing the rate of exploitation. It 
is precisely when the state intervenes to 
regulate monopolies that this identity of 
interests is being expressed.
